
第一场讲座
Kant (and Wolff) on Freedom and Reason
时间
2026年10月9日
15:00-17:00
地点
复旦大学光华楼西主楼2501
第二场讲座
Kant on the Dependencies of a Good Will
时间
2026年10月23日
15:00-17:00
地点
复旦大学光华楼西主楼2501
主讲人
Prof. Dr. Heiner F. Klemme
(Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg)
主持人
钱康
(复旦大学)
主办方
复旦大学哲学学院
复旦大学全球伦理研究中心
第一场讲座内容提要
Kant (and Wolff) on Freedom and Reason
The paper aims to contribute to the interpretation of the highest good in Kant. The first part examines the relationship between freedom as autonomy and freedom of choice, on the one hand, and reason, on the other. Some passages in the transcripts of Kant’s lectures seem to support the claim that reason is merely a means of maximizing our freedom. However, I will argue, drawing on Christian Wolff’s position, that this interpretation of the relationship between freedom and reason is incompatible with Kant’s critical moral philosophy. For Kant, there is no freedom without reason. Freedom is an idea of reason and, as a causality of the will, is determined by the moral law, whose source is reason. The second part addresses the relationship between freedom of the will and freedom of thought. I argue that, in Kant, freedom of thought is in some sense even more important than freedom of the will or practical reason, because without freedom of thought there could be neither truth nor trustworthiness. Truth and trustworthiness are conditions of the highest good.
第二场讲座内容提要
Kant on the Dependencies of a Good Will
Principles of heteronomy undoubtedly form an important part of Kant’s conception of the “dependent will.” However, not all forms of dependence characteristic of the “dependent will” are grounded in principles of heteronomy. Some are grounded in practical reason. These forms of dependence do not obstruct a morally good will; on the contrary, they make it possible. Even the good will is a dependent will. This paper aims to specify those forms of dependence that enable a “not absolutely good will” to be morally good. It focuses on three such dependencies: (a) obligation as dependence on the principle of autonomy, (b) practical interest as a dependence of our reason, and (c) our dependence on the idea of a final end. Since all these dependencies are grounded in different expressions of reason, we may say that the good will is dependent on reason.
主讲人简介

Prof. Dr. Heiner F. Klemme
Prof. Dr. Heiner F. Klemme,1962年生,现任德国马丁路德-哈勒维腾贝格大学哲学系哲学史教席教授,研究重点为康德哲学、近代哲学、德国启蒙运动、实践哲学等。兼任国际康德学会(Kant-Gesellschaft e. V.)主席会成员、学界顶刊Kant-Studien主编、启蒙哲学-沃尔夫学会(Christian-Wolff-Gesellschaft für die Philosophie der Aufklärung )第一主席,另兼任洪堡基金会、德国科研基金会(DFG)、德国学术交流基金会(DAAD)等组织机构的评委。Klemme教授已出版著作5部,编著20余部,论文130余篇,在康德学界拥有非常高的声望,是目前国际公认的十分杰出且活跃的康德学者。
主持人简介

钱康
钱康,复旦大学哲学学院青年副研究员,2022年于德国马丁路德-哈勒维腾贝格大学哲学系取得博士学位。主要研究方向为:康德哲学、西方伦理学史、当代元伦理学、德国启蒙运动。曾在Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte与《伦理学研究》《道德与文明》等刊物发表论文多篇。